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of-use#LAAELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION
IN U.S. CITIES*
FRANCESCO TREBBI
PHILIPPE AGHION
ALBERTO ALESINA
This paper studies the choice of electoral rules and in particular the question
of minority representation. Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through
strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in
electoral rules adopted by U.S. cities, particularly in the South, we show why
majorities tend to adopt “winner-take-all” city-wide rules (at-large elections) in
response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are
facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to
leverage on its sheer size instead of risking conceding representation to voters
from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer
to a ﬁfty-ﬁfty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to
prefer minority votes to be conﬁned in minority-packed districts. Single-member
district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these
implications of the model in a novel data set covering U.S. cities and towns from
1930 to 2000.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 was meant to protect
the right to vote for racial minorities, especially in the South. In
fact, in a reasonably short time, it resulted in a massive rein-
franchisement of black voters through an unprecedented effort of
voter registration. White majorities in cities of the South reacted
strategically to this federal legislation by changing the electoral
rules of their cities in order to minimize minority representation.
They only partially succeeded. Had they not been kept in check
by judicial intervention, they would have engaged in even more
openly strategic manipulation of rules. This paper presents evi-
dence of such strategic manipulation both around the time of the
introduction of the VRA and in the after-VRA period.
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The two traditional voting rules in American cities are at-
large elections, where the majority at the city level elects the
representatives on the city council, and district systems, where
representativesarechosenindistrictsorlocalwards.Proportional
representation systems were tried earlier in the past century and
then discarded precisely because they favored minority represen-
tation (racial and left wing/socialist) too much.1 In this paper
we show (in theory and then empirically) that white majorities
expecting an increase in black votes after the Voting Right Act
adopted at-large electoral rules when the black minority in the
city was relatively small, in order to win all seats. However, if the
minority share was larger (closer to a ﬁfty-ﬁfty split), the possibil-
ity of losing the whole city induced the white majority to conﬁne
black votes to minority-packed districts and single-member dis-
tricts: electoral rules serve this purpose.2
This paper provides a “positive” model of choice of electoral
rules. We do not study how rules should be chosen behind a veil of
ignorance to maximize social welfare, but how a majority knowing
that it may remain such or face a chance of loosing would choose
rules in its favor. Therefore the general point raised by this paper
is that voting rules are hardly exogenous and are chosen strate-
gically, although a vast literature has taken them as exogenous
or predetermined and studied their effects on policy choices.3 In
earlier work we had studied related issues in a cross section of
countries (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2004). Inthepresent paper
we study U.S. cities, which are an especially interesting case for
three reasons. First, it is quite compelling to identify the “major-
ity” with the whites and the “minority” with racial “minorities.”4
1. See for instance the discussion in Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and the ref-
erences cited therein.
2. Manipulation of electoral rules is not a prerogative exclusive of American
cities. For a discussion of electoral rules and racial politics in elections in India
see Pande (2003). Alexander (2004, p. 211) describes in detail the 1947 Gaullist
manipulations of electoral rules in France. In the Paris area, where the Gaullist
alliance was weak, they introduced proportional representation; in rural areas,
where the alliance was strong, they introduced plurality rule. Kreuzer (2004, p.
229) describes strategic manipulation in Germany. One could go on.
3. For a discussion of the effects of electoral rules taken as predetermined
or exogenous see Lijphart (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a sample
of democratic countries and Baqir (2002) for a cross section of U.S. cities. See
also Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba (1994), and Bohn and Inman (1996), among
others. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) offer a dissenting view, namely
that policies are determined by lobbying pressures that are not much affected by
institutional forms of government.
4. For discussion of the importance of race in American local politics, see for
instance Hacker (1992), Huckfeld and Kohfeld (1989), Wilson (1996), and Alesina,
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Second, the VRA offers an ideal “experiment” of a change in leg-
islation at the federal level that prompted strategic adaptation of
local rules. Third, U.S. cities present substantial cross-sectional
and time variation in their electoral rules.
This “positive” and strategic approach to models of voting
rules is relatively recent and rare,5 because most of the litera-
ture on constitutional choice of voting rules is normative, start-
ing from the work of Hayek (1960) and Buchanan and Tullock
(1962).6 A normative approach usually characterizes works in po-
litical science as well, with some notable exception such as Lipset
and Rokkan (1967), Riker (1986), and several essays in Colomer
(2004).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II develops a simple
formal setup. Section III describes the institutional context of U.S.
city governments and introduces our data. Section IV presents our
empirical results. The last section concludes.
II. A MODEL OF THE CHOICE OF ELECTORAL RULES
II.A. Basic Setup
There are two groups of voters in a city, whites (W) and blacks
(B). The initial relative size of the group of blacks is 1/2 >π>0,
so that the size of the larger white group is (1 − π). The whites are,
initiallyatleast,amajorityandtheyarethosewhochoosetheelec-
toral rule for the city. (We call the choice of the electoral rule the
“constitution.”) The population is equally spread over three (ex-
ogenously apportioned7) electoral districts, numbered 1,2,3, each
with M individuals, and the city council consists of three seats.
The initial numbers of black and white voters in each district are
given by Bi and Wi for i = 1,2,3. We assume that W1 = M and
W2 = W3 = (1/2 + z)M, where z is a real number between −1/4
and 1/2, which ensures that 0 <π<1/2, because
z =
1 − 3π
2
. (1)
5. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) discuss how the choice of alternative electoral
rules, which are themselves associated with different policy choices over the wel-
fare state, is indeed the result of strategic constitutional choices. See for instance
the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) on the origin of democratic institutions.
6. For a survey of the literature on constitutional theory, see Voigt (1997).
7. The model will abstract from gerrymandering of the electoral districts and
the vast literature on the matter. On gerrymandering, see Cox and Katz (2002)
and Friedman and Holden (2005).328 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
The parameter z is a shift term that makes it possible to vary
the initial number of black voters in a district and links the city-
wide racial composition to the district-wide racial composition.
The white majority chooses the electoral rule, through which a
three-member council is elected. After the constitution is chosen,
there is a shock to the composition of voters in the city, which the
electoral rule cannot be made contingent upon.8 More formally,
during the interim phase (deﬁned as the time span between the
choice of electoral rule and the election of the council), an exoge-
nously given mass LN of new black voters join the polity, with
LN = αM, where α is a random variable uniformly distributed
between 0 and an upper bound α ∈ (1,2). Half of the newcomers
locate in district 2, and half in district 3.
Different compositions of the council imply different policies,
and therefore different ex post payoffs for the white. r (resp. u0
and r) is the utility level of a white agent when there are no
(resp. one and two) white representative(s) on the council. The ex
ante expected utility of a white constitution writer can then be
expressed as
Uw = (1 − p0 − p1)r + p1u0 + p0r, r > u0 > r,
where pj denotestheprobabilitythat j councilrepresentativesare
white in the interim stage. Thus, having some representation is
betterthanhavingnoneatall,9 and,ingeneral,voters’preferences
are increasing in their electoral representation. The electoral rule
chosen by the white voters determines the value of p0 and p1.
Summarizing: (1) the electoral rule is chosen by the white group;
(2) newblack voters jointhepolityand elections determine agiven
composition of the council; (3) payoffs realize.
II.B. Electoral Rules and Expected Utilities
With an eye to the case of American cities, we now study two
alternative electoral rules. The ﬁrst one, “at-large” (AL), allocates
all seats to the party that wins more than ﬁfty percent of the votes
of the entire city. The second rule, “single-member district rule”
(SD), requires that each candidate run in a particular district
8. See Laffont (2000) and Aghion and Bolton (2003) for a detailed discussion
of this “incomplete contract” approach to constitutions in political economy.
9. See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) for a legislative model and an extensive
discussion of this assumption and a comparison with alternatives.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 329
and obtain a majority of votes in that district. These are reason-
able approximations of the electoral rules in U.S. cities, although
details of electoral formulae vary considerably across municipali-
ties. Given our assumptions on the group composition of the three
districts, p1 = 0 under the AL rule, and p0 = 0 with the SD rule.
Under the at-large rule the ex ante expected utility of constitution
writers in the W group is
UAL
W = pAL
0 r +

1 − pAL
0

r = r − pAL
0  ,
where   = r − r is the loss from losing the majority, and pAL
0 =
Pr(α>1 + 4z) is the probability of the whites losing the majority
under AL.10 Substituting for z as a function of π in pAL
0 using
(1), the ex ante expected loss of the whites (relative to the bliss
pointr) under the AL rule is equal to LAL
W = pAL
0   = (1 − (3/α)(1 −
2π))+ ,where we use the notation x+ = max{x,0}. Under the SD
rulecouncilseatsareallocatedatthedistrictlevel.Theprobability
pSD
1 of the blacks winning a majority of two seats is equal to the
probability that districts 2 and 3 are won by the blacks. Thus the
ex ante utility of the whites under the single-member district rule
can be expressed as
USD
W = pSD
1 u0 +

1 − pSD
1

r = r − pSD
1 δ,
where δ = r − u0 is the constitution writers’ loss from losing the
majority. Substituting for z in the probability pSD
1 = Pr(α>4z),11
and using (1), the ex ante expected loss of white constitution
writers under the SD rule is equal to LSD
W = pSD
1 δ = (1 − (2/α)(1 −
3π)+)+δ.
II.C. The Size of Minorities and the Choice of Electoral Rule
Ex ante in the constitutional stage, the whites choose the
electoral rule that minimizes the expected loss LW. If initially the
whites command a very large majority of votes, the constitution
writers do not fear they can lose the majority under either rule;
thus they are indifferent between the two rules. As the relative
size of the blacks increases, however, at some point it becomes
preferable for the whites to move to AL in order to reduce the
10. Thisprobabilityisobtainedbyconsidering pAL
0 = Pr(B1 + B2 + B3 + LN >
W1 + W2 + W3).
11. This is the probability that blacks win a two-seats majority, or pSD
1 =
Pr(B3 + (1/2)αM > W3) = Pr(α>4z).330 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
power of the black voters in districts 2 and 3 by confronting them
with the whole pool of white voters, including those in district
1. Doing so allows the whites to preserve their majority in the
council. When the fraction of blacks reaches the point where it
becomes impossible to ensure that for every realization of α they
might become the new majority, moving to the SD rule allows the
whites tolimittheirpossiblelosses:as π becomes sufﬁcientlyclose
to 1/2 , the risk of losing all three districts and thereby incurring
the large loss   makes the whites prefer a SD system. In fact SD
guarantees the whites at least 1 seat on the council—and thereby
limits their loss to δ<  , given that in this case black voters are
restricted to commanding districts 2 and 3 only. More formally:
PROPOSITION 1. a. Both rules, AL and SD, involve no utility loss to
whites when π ∈ (0,1/3 − α/6 ) ;b .i f >δ ,then there exists a
unique cut-off point  π ∈ (1/3 − α/6,1/2) such that LAL
W < LSD
W
if π ∈ (1/3 − α/6, π)a n dLAL
W > LSD
W if π ∈ ( π,1/2); c. if   = δ,
then for all π ∈ (1/3 − α/6,1/2) the AL rule dominates the
SD rule.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Figure I represents graphically the loss functions LAL
W and
LSD
W , where πAL
0 (resp. πSD
0 ) is the size of the minority at which the
expected loss under AL (resp. SD) becomes positive.
II.D. N Districts and Mixed Systems
We now consider two empirically relevant generalizations of
the problem. Suppose that the population is equally spread over
N electoral districts, with M individuals in each, which elect a
council of size N. We maintain a distinction between two types of
districts: districts with W1 = M and districts with W2 = (1/2 + z)
M, where Wj denotes the number of whites in a type-j district.
Type 1 districts are white, whereas type 2 districts are an ex ante
identical mix of whites and blacks. There are N1 type-1 districts;
therefore N2 = N − N1, and N1 < N2. During the interim phase a
mass αM of black newcomers arrives, with α ∼ U[0,α]a n dα<
N. Assume that the whites’ utility u(·) is deﬁned over the share
of seats won, where we indicate   = u(1) − u(0) and δ = u(1) −
u(N1/N), following the notation of Proposition 1. Proposition 1
then generalizes to the N-district case: namely, we can show that
there exist a ﬁrst cutoff point πSD
0 ∈ (0,1/2) such that there is no
utility loss for the whites in (0,πSD
0 ) under any rule, and a secondELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 331
FIGURE I
Expected Loss under Different Electoral Rules as a Function of π
cutoff point ˆ π ∈ (πAL
0 , 1
2)12 such that expected losses under the two
rules AL and SD satisfy
LAL
W < LSD
W if π ∈

πSD
0 , ˆ π

; LAL
W > LSD
W if π ∈

ˆ π,
1
2

.
Consider now the case of mixed electoral rules for risk-averse
white voters. Consider a city with a council of size NTOT = ρN.
Let us now assume ρ>1 to allow mixed systems: at least one
representative for each single-member district and NAL > 0a t -
large representatives. Assume whites’ preferences to be deﬁned
again over the share of seats won on the council. In a setup
with risk-neutral agents, it is never optimal to have mixed sys-
temsinvolvingbothsingle-districtandat-largecouncilmen:either
AL or SD offers the highest expected number of winning seats.
Although a risk-neutral white agent considers exclusively the ex-
pected seat-share and has no incentive to convexify, a risk-averse
12. Where πAL
0 = (1/2)(1 − α/N) >π SD
0 = (N2/2N)(1 − α/N2).332 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
FIGURE II
Choice of SD Seats Share as Function of π
constitutional writer may ﬁnd it useful to reduce the risk of run-
ning pure at-large elections when the opportunity of winning
safer single-district seats is available. The following proposition
presents this result more formally:
PROPOSITION 2. Consider a city of N districts, council of size NTOT,
and black newcomers’ arrival αM,α∼ U[0,α], N1 < α<N.
If the white constitutional writers are risk-averse with utility
u(·), u  > 0, u   < 0, deﬁned over the share of seats won, then
there is an interval (π3,π 4),π 4 < 1/2, and a mixed system
with NSD > 0 single-district seats and NAL > 0 at-large seats
for which UAL
W < UMX
W and USD
W < UMX
W if π ∈ (π3,π 4), where
UAL
W is the expected utility under AL, UMX
W is the expected
utility under a mixed system, and USD
W is the expected utility
under SD.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Figure II reports a numerical example of the optimal share of
single-member district councilmen as a function of the ex ante sizeELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 333
FIGURE III
Expected Utility under Different Electoral Rules as Function of π
of the minority for a stylized city of N = 12 districts with N1 = 3,
ρ = 5, and white voters with quadratic preferences, as generated
by the model. The fundamental nonlinearity in the choice of the
electoral rule extends to the case of mixed systems (notice the
ascending part of the step function that indicates the choice of
mixed systems). The parabolic curve (quadratic ﬁt) that approx-
imates the relation between π and the ratio of SD seats in the
council (indicated as SDshare) is precisely the relation we will
investigate empirically in Section IV. Figure III reports the ex-
pected utilities for the whites under the different electoral rules
at various levels of π.The mixed system curve traces the combina-
tion of SD and AL seats that is optimal (i.e., that has the highest
expected utility for the whites) at any given π. Over the range
where this curve does not coincide with either pure SD or pure
AL, the chosen electoral rule includes both single-member district
and at-large councilmen.334 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
III. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND DATA
III.A. The Voting Rights Act and Its Implementation
There was no constitutional protection for voting and elec-
toral participation in the United States before the Civil War.13
African American individuals in a state of servitude were granted
neither citizenship nor voting rights. After the war, during the
Reconstruction (1867–1877), Congress provided such constitu-
tional protection with the ratiﬁcation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1868 (conferring citizenship to all persons born or nat-
uralized in the United States) and the Fifteenth Amendment in
1870 (providing that the right of vote should not be denied or
abridged on the basis of race, color, or previous status of servi-
tude). It is widely acknowledged that the Reconstruction failed
to truly enfranchise black voters in the South, whose represen-
tation in fact went steadily down from the 1870s to the 1960s
due to various de facto obstacles to their registration. This does
not mean, of course, that no black person would vote, but the
share of black voters was quite small. In 1868 there were 300
blacks elected to state legislatures from confederate states; in
1900 there were 5.14 The Progressive era (1900–1917) fostered
substantial institutional innovations in the direction of reducing
representation of minorities. At-large elections were widely intro-
duced both in the South and in the North with the purported scope
of curbing corruption and log-rolling between localized factional
interests, historically represented by SD, but de facto aiming at
reducing the inﬂuence of immigrants and (the very few) black
voters.
President Lyndon Johnson ratiﬁed the 24th Amendment
to the Constitution15 (1964) and signed into law both the Civil
Rights Act in 1964 and the Voting Rights Act in 1965. LBJ relied
on a coalition of Northern democrats and republicans to pass the
act against the opposition of Southern democrats. The goal of the
VRA was (and is) to remove obstacles in voting registration pro-
cedures for racial minorities. Section 2 of the Act included a broad
13. WerefertotheUnitedStates DepartmentofJustice,CivilRightsDivision,
Voting Section, for further details and references for this section.
14. See in particular the discussion in Kousser (1999) and Grofman and
Davidson (1992).
15. Theamendmentoutlawedthepolltaxinfederalelections.Virginiaratiﬁed
the amendment in 1977, albeit the ratiﬁcation process was completed on January
23, 1964 (by 38 states). The amendment was ratiﬁed by North Carolina in 1989.
The amendment was rejected by the state of Mississippi (and not subsequently
ratiﬁed) in 1962.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 335
reassessment of the principles embedded in the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. It deemed illegal the use of poll taxes,
literacy tests, and the requirement of ﬂuency in English for
voting eligibility. As a consequence of the Voting Rights Act, the
number of registered minority voters as a fraction of voting age
population doubled and in some cases tripled in Alabama, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia between 1965 and 1988
(Grofman, Handley, and Niemi 1992).16 Even though white South-
erners grudgingly had to remove obstacles to black registration
(the penalty was jail), they immediately started trying to change
electoral laws to minimize the probability of electing black rep-
resentatives. For instance, already in January 1966, an all-white
legislature in Mississippi, without much discussion and unani-
mously, passed thirteen bills concerning the election process, most
of them moving various types of elections to an at-large system.17
The purpose was clearly to dilute black votes. Eventually in 1969,
inAllenv.StateBoardofElection,theSupremeCourtstruckdown
most of these bills. In fact, the mid-sixties mark the beginning of
a long series of court battles about vote diluting, gerrymandering,
and various other maneuvers of the white majority to minimize
black inﬂuence. Different lower courts ruled in different ways and
there was much uncertainty about how each speciﬁc ruling would
go, given the complexity of the issues involved.18 Because of all
these disagreements in the lower courts, the Supreme Court in
1980 took on the case of City of Mobile v. Bolden and established
the need to prove discriminatory purposes when challenging a
change in electoral rules.19 The language of the majority opinion
16. Amy(2002)reportsthat“thenumberofblackelectedofﬁcialsintheUnited
States grew an average 16.7 percent a year between 1970 and 1977, from 1469
to 4311” (p. 129). In 1999, according to the Joint Center for Political and Eco-
nomic Studies, the total number of black elected ofﬁcials was 5,938 in the South
(respectively 8,936 in all states), of which 340 were city mayors (resp. 450 na-
tionwide), 2,677 members of municipal governing bodies (resp. 3,498 nationwide).
There were no black senators in 1999 and 19 representatives from the South (39
black representatives nationwide). See also Cole (1976).
17. See the detailed discussion by Parker (1990).
18. For a revealing review of extremely different point of views held by op-
posing expert witnesses in the cases, see Grofman, Handley, and Niemi (1992) in
Grofman and Davidson (1992).
19. In 1980 the Supreme Court imposed the requirement of proof of “racial
discriminatorypurpose”invotedilutioncases(Mobilev.Bolden,446U.S.55,1980).
This was rectiﬁed by a 1982 Congressional amendment dispensing with such
proof. The Supreme Court substantially challenged “afﬁrmative gerrymandering”
inShawv.Reno,509U.S.630(1993)andHoldenv.Hall,512U.S.874(1994),among
others. Under President Bill Clinton, the National Voter Registration Act (also
knownpopularlyastheMotorVoterActof1993)aimedatstronglypromotingvoter
registration (for example, through the Department of Motor Vehicles structures,336 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
suggested a very high standard of proof for active discrimi-
nation.20 In a reaction to this ruling, a 1982 Congressional
amendment dispensed with such proof. Finally, in 1986, in the
ruling of Thornbourg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court clariﬁed what
had to be considered active discrimination in a series of points,
including the presence of block voting, a history of racial discrim-
ination, evidence of vote diluting, and gerrymandering. Although
thecourtdidclarifytheissue,stillaverylargegreyareapersisted.
For instance, as our model itself suggests, the fact that moving to
at-large election may dilute black votes, but sometimes moving
to single-member districts may disadvantage blacks as well, was
already in the minds of litigants in the seventies, eighties, and
nineties (see Chapter 5 of Grofman, Handley, and Niemi [1992]).
Also, it was not clear how many of the points were necessary
and/orsufﬁcienttoprovediscrimination.Thisisnotafailureofthe
Court per se, but just reﬂects the complexity of the issues at hand.
From this brief historical excursus, we need to remember
three points germane to our empirical analysis: (1) Until the mid-
sixties white majorities did not have to worry about black votes in
the South; only with the Voting Act of 1965 were blacks really a
political block to reckon with electorally. (2) The implementation
by the courts of the Voting Rights Act also took up the issues of
the choice of electoral rules, precisely to avoid choices (such as
at-large elections) that would have favored the white majority. (3)
Attempts of the white majority to change electoral laws were kept
in check by the courts, which became increasingly concerned.
But at least well into the eighties and even beyond that, much
uncertainty remained about what could or could not be challenged
in courts. So a fair amount of room for maneuvering remained
for the white majority to strategically manipulate electoral rules.
In a sense, without court interventions, our ﬁnding below would
be even stronger, because the white majority could have acted
unconstrainedly.
III.B. Data and Summary Statistics
This section brieﬂy reviews the main variables employed in
the empirical analysis. We refer the reader to the separate Data
unemployment, and welfare bureaus). More recently, the Help America Vote Act
of 2001 has shifted back to individual states most of the supervisory power over
the quality of electoral franchise. Voting Rights Acts renewal hearings are due in
2007.
20. See Grofman, Handley, and Niemi (1992).ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 337
Appendix21 for details on variables deﬁnition, construction, and
sources. We gathered two sets of data: one including characteris-
tics of city governments and their institutional details; the other
including demographic, economic, and geographic characteristics
of U.S. cities. We collected information on U.S. municipal govern-
ment characteristics for the period 1930–2000, at ten-year inter-
vals, from the Form of Government Survey and Municipal Year
Book by the International City/County Management Association
(ICMA) in Washington, DC.22
From the various issues of the ICMA surveys,23 we collected
information on electoral rules and forms of government for each
municipality, including council size; number of district-awarded
council seats; and number of councilmen belonging to different
racial groups currently sitting in the council. We constructed a
single-district variable SDshare, a continuous variable deﬁned
as the fraction of councilmen elected in single districts. In 2001
about 65.9% of the cities in the sample presented only at-large-
elected councilmen; about 14.8% presented only district-elected
councilmen. The remaining cities had some combination of the
two types of rules (mixed), with councils consisting of a fraction of
councilmen representing speciﬁc geographic areas and the others
“representing the whole city.”
From the decade issues of the Bureau of the Census of Popu-
lation we collected information on total population, racial groups
sizes, median household income, and geographic characteristics of
places and minor civil divisions (MCDs).24 With regard to racial
composition, from 1930 to 1970 the data available allow a break-
down into three groups: white, black, and other races (we did not
distinguish between foreign-born and native). From 1980 the Cen-
sus allows a more reﬁned racial breakdown.25 Because our empir-
ical analysis runs from the thirties to the nineties, for consistency
21. Due to space limitations we produce the Data Appendix in a separate
document, available on request. Please refer to the authors’ Web pages for a down-
loadable version of the Data Appendix.
22. The ICMA is a professional organization of city managers and adminis-
trators publishing local government data since 1914 and a recognized scholarly
source. ICMA data have been employed in a number of papers, including Baqir
(2002), Sass and Pittman (2000), and DeSantis and Renner (1992), among others.
23. Data from 1980 onward are available in electronic format; data before
1980 needed to be collected and entered from hard copies. For this reason we
decided to collect data before 1960 only for the South, because it was in the South
that the effect of the Voting Rights Act was more relevant and should show larger
differences before and after the mid-1960s.
24. Deﬁnitions and references in the Data Appendix.
25. In general the breakdown includes at least whites, blacks, Hispanics,
Asians, Paciﬁc Islanders, and Native Americans.338 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
weusedthethree-groupsbreakdown(white,blacks,others)forthe
entire sample. Our variable of interest is the size of nonwhites.
A ﬁnal caveat: ICMA surveys present different coverage de-
pending on the year. We review their representativeness in terms
of population characteristics vis-` a-vis the corresponding entire
U.S. Census of Population places and MCDs in the Data Appendix.
The bottom line is that the sample of U.S. cities collected by ICMA
is representative of the total population of relatively large cities,
above 2,500 inhabitants, and less representative of the full popu-
lation of the Bureau of the Census places and minor civil divisions
(MCDs). This is why in what follows we always report results for
cities above the threshold of 2,500.26 In the Appendix Tables A.1
and A.2 we report summary statistics for the key variables of
interest for the sample of all U.S. cities and for the sample of
Southern cities.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We now focus on the main prediction of our model, namely
that the preference of whites for at-large rules over single-member
district increases and then decreases with the initial size of the mi-
nority group. This section reports four results. First, we present
cross-sectional and panel evidence of our main prediction for U.S.
cities during the entire period after the enfranchisement of minor-
ityvoters(theVRA).Second,weshowtheabsenceofarelationship
between at-large and single-member district rules and the initial
size of the minority group during the entire period before the VRA
in the South. Third, we focus on the changes taking place around
the VRA (immediately before and after the treatment). Fourth, we
consider the evidence that an effect of electoral rules on minority
representation is present and operates according to the intuition
of the model.
IV.A. The Choice of Electoral Rules
Empirical Strategy. The empirical strategy in Table I and in
the majority of the following tables is a simple, yet ﬂexible, linear
(in the coefﬁcients) parametric model of the choice of electoral
rules. For each city i in year t let us deﬁne the electoral rule
26. We were also able to obtain the full lists of cities sampled from the ICMA
for the last survey in year 2001 and we verify the absence of any response selection
in the survey; see the Data Appendix.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 339
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variable, SDshareit, the relative size of the nonwhite minority, πit,
a vector of (k× 1) controls, Xit, in our baseline speciﬁcation: the
log of city population and median household income. We specify
the following equation in levels:
SDshareit = β0 + πitβ1 + (πit)
2 β2 + X 
itγ + uit (2)
for i = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,T.
We perform our analysis both in a cross-section for given t
and in a two-way panel in which we account for unobserved, time-
invariant heterogeneity at the city level and for time-speciﬁc ef-
fects.27 In the latter case we assume a two-way error component
uit = αi + δt + ηit. Employing within-city variation allows us to ac-
count for unobserved heterogeneity and estimate consistently the
vector β = (β1,β 2). Time-speciﬁc effects are similarly useful in ac-
counting for across-the-board effects, such as federal legislation,
that again need to be controlled for, especially in the post-1965
period when legislation was extremely active. We address the is-
sue of serial correlation in the error component η by relaxing
the assumption of independence and clustering at the city level.
Conditional heteroscedasticity of unknown type is also accounted
for in all standard errors both in the cross-section and the panel
results.
Identiﬁcation. The most likely source of reverse causation
affecting (2) is endogenous sorting across municipalities driven
by more favorable electoral rules. However, Tiebout sorting would
predict a correlation between changes in city racial composition
and in electoral rules of the opposite sign to that predicted by our
model, dampening the least-squares estimates toward zero.
To see this, suppose that, given a small size of the minor-
ity, π, a city changes its electoral rule in favor of white voters
against black voters by decreasing the number of single-district
seats on the council. In this case Tiebout sorting would predict a
decrease in the size of the minority (blacks would leave the city
and possibly more whites could join in), implying a positive cor-
relation between the share of single-district seats and the size of
the minority at small π. Now suppose that, given a large size of
the minority, π, a city changes its electoral rule by increasing the
number of single-district seats on the council. Under the basic
setup of Proposition 1, this produces an unambiguous reduction
27. Formal F-tests for this speciﬁcation support the use of a two-way setup.
Both groups of ﬁxed effects are jointly signiﬁcant in every speciﬁcation.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 341
of the expected utility of the blacks. Tiebout sorting would pre-
dict a decrease in the size of the minority (blacks would leave the
city and possibly more whites would join in), implying a negative
correlation between the share of single-district seats and the size
of the minority at large π. However, it is enough to move to our
more general theoretical setup, including risk aversion, to see that
moving toward single-member districts at high π may produce an
increase in the utility of both groups. In this case Tiebout sorting
could produce an overestimate of the true slope of the U-curve in
the rightmost range of π. We address this potential endogeneity
by instrumenting the fraction of the minority with ten-year lags
andgeographiclocation(anindicatorvariabletakingvalue1ifthe
city is in the South). Distant lags and geographic location should
be considered predetermined or exogenous (the case for the South)
and therefore valid instruments of the current size of the minor-
ity. Exclusion restrictions can be tested given overidentiﬁcation of
the system.
Results. Table I presents the results concerning the main non-
monotonicity. The table refers to the sample of U.S. cities28 in 1990
for the cross-sectional analysis (in columns (1)–(3)) and to the pe-
riod 1970–2000 for the panel analysis (columns (4) and (5)). The
model calls for a negative linear and a positive quadratic coefﬁ-
cient on the share of the nonwhite minority.29 The signs of the
coefﬁcients are consistent with this story and signiﬁcant at stan-
dard conﬁdence levels both individually and jointly. Looking at
column (1), the estimated coefﬁcients imply that the U-shaped
curve reaches a minimum (indicated with π∗) at about 43.8%
nonwhite minority. (Note that 94.5% of the cities in the year 1990
were below this level.) In column (2) we include for robustness a
larger set of controls, ofwhich we do not report the coefﬁcients. For
column (2) the controls are the squared log of city population and
income, the fraction of population employed in manufacturing,
28. As for all the rest of our empirical analysis, we exclude from the sample
those cities for which we have information that the change of structure of govern-
ment is the result of court mandate or state law. We also exclude cities below 2,500,
as the ICMA sample is representative of the U.S. Census of Population places and
MCDs in this group. Similar results were obtained when employing the complete
sample of municipalities or performing the cross-sectional analysis for the years
1980 and 2000.
29. Note that one may want to exclude cities in which whites are a minority.
There are very few of these, and in addition, even when whites are a minority
in terms of number of inhabitants, demographic factors and voting participation
patterns may still make them a majority as active voters (see Amy [2002] for an
example). For this reason it is unclear which cities to drop from the sample. We
tried a few experiments and our results appear robust.342 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
agriculture, mining, trade, and ﬁnancial services, and the fraction
above 65 years of age. The estimated coefﬁcients support qualita-
tively the results of column (1), with a lower minimum at 0.388,
and are again individually and jointly signiﬁcant.
Column (3) reports 2SLS estimates of the speciﬁcation in
column (1). Consistent with our previous discussion concerning
identiﬁcation, the coefﬁcients on the linear and quadratic terms
become larger in absolute value and outside the 95% conﬁdence
interval for the estimates of column (1). This ﬁnding seems to sug-
gest a reduction of the possible attenuation bias stemming from
Tiebout sorting. A J-test for overidentiﬁcation of all instruments
produces a p-value of .12, thus not rejecting the validity of the in-
struments set in terms of exclusion restrictions. It is a low value,
however, given the low power properties of the test. The minimum
for the U-shaped curve is estimated at 0.318 minority size.
In columns (4) and (5) we tackle the issue of unobserved het-
erogeneity at the city level in our baseline speciﬁcation and in one
where additional controls are added. For column (5), controls are
the squared log of city population and median income. We obtain
estimates of β = (β1,β 2) close to the 2SLS estimates and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level (both individually and
jointly).
To gauge quantitatively the size of the two effects in Table I,
we can start from the empirical distribution of minorities in U.S.
cities in the year 1990 for the cities in our sample.30 The me-
dian (Q5) for the fraction of minority is 5.5% and the ninth decile
(Q9) is 34.3%. At Q5, given estimated coefﬁcients in column (4)
of −0.622 and 1.078 (with robust standard errors respectively
0.202 and 0.284), an increase of one standard deviation of mi-
nority sizes (15.3%) implies a reduction of −5.3% of the fraction
of single-district seats. This is equivalent to about one-third seat
switchingfromsingle-memberdistricttoat-largeinacouncilofsix
seats (the mean council size in the 1990 sample). At Q9, the same
increase of one standard deviation would instead produce an in-
crease of about +4.4% in the fraction of single-district seats. This
would be equivalent to more than one-fourth seat switching from
at-large to single-district in a council of six seats. The estimates
are quantitatively reasonable, since the voting rights legislation
over the years has imposed increasing limits on institutional
changes.
30. But likewise for the decades 1980, 2000.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 343
We also separately run a battery of robustness checks that we
do not report for parsimony of presentation First, we have consid-
ered a discrete version of our dependent variable, SD, and found
analogous evidence of themain nonmonotonicity forboth the cross
section and the panel (using conditional logit ﬁxed effects). Simi-
larly, we have considered a (two-sided) limited dependent variable
(LDV)approach:aTobitandIVTobitestimatorforcolumns(1)–(3)
and a random effects Tobit estimator grouping observations at the
city level for columns (4) and (5). This is a way of incorporating the
empirical feature that SDshare is constrained to be in [0,1]. The
implications of Table I carry over to the LDV speciﬁcation consis-
tently with the predictions of Proposition 1. Second, because time
dependence is an important characteristic of political systems, we
have included the t − 10 lag of SDshare and employed a standard
dynamic panel technique, through ﬁrst differencing and applica-
tion of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator. The consis-
tency of the standard linear model and this dynamic extension are
sources of reassurance. The dynamic model delivers larger effects,
in the range of one-half seat in a council of six (toward and away
from AL), especially for the South. Third, we have also considered
a simple nonparametric approach, expecting to observe two basic
regularities in the data: (1) the slope of a within-city regression of
the single-district variable on the fraction of the minority should
be increasing in subsamples where the average minority size is
increasingly higher; (2) we would expect statistically signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients of negative sign to appear at relatively small values of
the fraction of the minority (the steeper downward-bending part
of the U) and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of positive sign to
appearatrelativelylargevaluesofthefractionoftheminority(the
steeper upward-bending part of the U). A ﬂat and insigniﬁcant re-
lationship should appear in the middle range. Both regularities
seem supported by the data. Fourth, as additional nonparamet-
ric evidence, we have estimated the cross-sectional regression of
Table I using dummies by quintile of the minority population. The
coefﬁcients on the dummies ﬁrst decrease and then increase (at
the ﬁfth quintile) as expected (however, only the decreasing por-
tion of the U curve produces statistically signiﬁcant contrasts).
IV.B. Before the VRA
An important validation issue in the empirical strategy con-
cerns the timing of the Voting Rights Act. We employ such data as
an informative source of variation for institutional manipulation.344 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
TABLE II
PRE-VRA IN THE SOUTH:V ALIDATION TESTS
Fraction of councilmen elected by district
Cross-section Cross-section Panel
1950 1960 1930–1960
Estimator: OLS OLS City F. E.
(1) (2) (3)
Frac. minority 0.308 0.226 0.406
[0.413] [0.358] [0.841]
(Frac. minority)2 −0.852 −0.478 −0.661
[0.776] [0.744] [1.322]
Log(city population) −0.045 −0.015 0.001
[0.021]∗∗ [0.017] [0.042]
Log(median income) −0.145
[0.058]∗∗
Observations 486 652 1,482
R2 .01 .02 .81
No relation F-test .376 .811 .882
(p-value)
Notes. Robust standard errors in brackets below coefﬁcients. ∗Signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%;
∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. In panels (a) and (b) standard errors are clustered at the city level for column (3).
Regressions of column (3) include year ﬁxed effects. No relation F-test refers to the joint test for the null
hypothesis that (frac. minority) and (frac. minority)2 are zero.
Table II reproposes the speciﬁcations of columns (1) and (4) of
Table I before the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The sample covers
Southern cities before the VRA. Column (1) refers to the 1950
cross section,31 column (2) to the 1960 cross section, and the panel
analysis covers the period 1930–1960. Here the coefﬁcients on
the size of the minority and its square are statistically zero. Joint
F-tests for the linear and quadratic terms of minority size present
high p-values (.376 for column (1) in Panel A) and the coefﬁcients
display changes of sign. This is consistent with our hypothesis
that before the Voting Act electoral rules were unaffected by the
city racial composition, because racial minorities were almost
completely disenfranchised.
IV.C. The VRA
In this section we try to identify the effect of the extension of
the electoral franchise in the immediate aftermath of the VRA on
31. Median household income is not available before 1960; hence it is not
included in speciﬁcations covering those years.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 345
the choice of electoral rules from the subsequent legal restrictions
imposed on the choice of the electoral rules. A way of addressing
this issue is to make appropriate use of the timing of the voting
rights lawsuits and Supreme Court jurisprudence. Accordingly,
Table III focuses on the period around the VRA but before the
Supreme Court decision32 of 1969 (the early post-VRA sample).
Our approach is to take the percent minority in 1960 and use it
to predict the change in institutions between 1960 and 1967 (the
closest ICMA survey available) in southern cities, the ones more
directly affected by the VRA. The drawback of focusing solely on
the immediate post-VRA sample, however, is that only partial
registration of the minorities had been accomplished before 1967
and full enfranchisement even of large minority groups was
still uncertain and surely incomplete. We estimate the following
speciﬁcation:
 SDsharei,1960−1967 = πi,1960β1
+(πi,1960)2β2 +  X 
i1960−1967γ +  ui1960−1967. (3)
The coefﬁcients β = (β1,β 2) can be interpreted as a measure of
the effect of an increase in the relative size of racial minorities in
the South on the electoral rules.
Estimates33 of the gap between fractions of white and black
registered voters decreased from 44.1% to 27.4% from 1965 to
1967, but with half the black population still disenfranchised.
In a city with 50% blacks in 1967 only 25% were voting, leaving
whites34 1.6 to 1. This means that our analysis will be particularly
apt at capturing the effects at low π.
TableIIIpresentstheresults.IntheupperpartofTableIIIwe
ﬁrst report tabulations of all the within-city changes in electoral
rules that identify (3). By splitting the sample by electoral rule in
1960 we are able to detect two relevant facts: (i) in 1960 the major-
ity of the cites in the South were AL (SDshare < .5), a remnant of
the Progressive era; (ii) the bulk of the changes happened in cities
where SDshare >. 5. Basically all Southern cities employing an
AL rule kept it unchanged at the moment of the black enfranchise-
ment,andavastmajorityoftheSDcitiesmovedtowardat-largein
awayconsistentwithintuitionandourmodel.Ifacitymoves from
32. Allen v. State Board of Election.
33. See Grofman, Handley, and Niemi (1992, p. 23).
34. Assuming an average white registration rate around 80% (see Grofman,
Handley, and Niemi [1992, p. 23]).346 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
T
A
B
L
E
I
I
I
P
O
S
T
-
V
R
A
R
E
A
C
T
I
O
N
T
O
M
I
N
O
R
I
T
Y
E
N
F
R
A
N
C
H
I
S
E
M
E
N
T
A
N
D
T
H
E
S
E
L
E
C
T
I
O
N
O
F
E
L
E
C
T
O
R
A
L
R
U
L
E
S
I
N
T
H
E
S
O
U
T
H
B
E
F
O
R
E
A
L
L
E
N
V
.
S
T
A
T
E
B
O
A
R
D
O
F
E
L
E
C
T
I
O
N
S
(
1
9
6
9
)
T
a
b
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
e
l
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
r
u
l
e
s
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
>
0
.
5
1
9
6
0
<
0
.
5
V
R
A
-
1
9
6
0
>
.
5
1
9
6
0
<
.
5
A
l
l
S
o
u
t
h
(
S
D
)
(
A
L
)
C
o
v
e
r
e
d
(
S
D
)
(
A
L
)
 
(
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
)
>
0
1
7
4
6
1
5
 
(
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
)
=
0
5
4
3
9
8
2
2
2
5
2
 
(
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
)
<
0
9
0
3
4
3
9
2
T
o
t
.
5
9
7
1
6
1
4
3
6
3
3
6
6
7
2
6
9
W
i
t
h
i
n
-
c
i
t
y
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
m
e
n
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
b
y
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
9
6
0
a
n
d
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
>
0
.
5
1
9
6
0
<
0
.
5
V
R
A
-
1
9
6
0
>
0
.
5
1
9
6
0
<
0
.
5
A
l
l
S
o
u
t
h
(
S
D
)
(
A
L
)
C
o
v
e
r
e
d
(
S
D
)
(
A
L
)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
:
F
i
r
s
t
d
i
f
f
.
F
i
r
s
t
d
i
f
f
.
F
i
r
s
t
d
i
f
f
.
F
i
r
s
t
d
i
f
f
.
F
i
r
s
t
d
i
f
f
.
F
i
r
s
t
d
i
f
f
.
(
1
)
(
2
)
(
3
)
(
4
)
(
5
)
(
6
)
F
r
a
c
.
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
1
9
6
0
−
0
.
1
4
3
−
2
.
3
3
5
0
.
4
3
3
−
0
.
1
4
6
−
2
.
5
6
0
0
.
4
5
7
[
0
.
3
5
3
]
[
0
.
7
3
9
]
∗
∗
∗
[
0
.
2
3
9
]
∗
[
0
.
3
6
3
]
[
0
.
9
7
7
]
∗
∗
[
0
.
2
3
5
]
∗
(
F
r
a
c
.
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
1
9
6
0
)
2
−
0
.
1
2
5
3
.
1
0
4
−
0
.
9
4
0
−
0
.
1
0
0
3
.
9
0
5
−
0
.
9
1
1
[
0
.
7
7
5
]
[
1
.
4
8
7
]
∗
∗
[
0
.
4
8
0
]
∗
[
0
.
7
5
8
]
[
1
.
8
0
4
]
∗
∗
[
0
.
4
5
7
]
∗
∗ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 347
T
A
B
L
E
I
I
I
(
C
O
N
T
I
N
U
E
D
)
W
i
t
h
i
n
-
c
i
t
y
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
c
o
u
n
c
i
l
m
e
n
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
b
y
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
9
6
0
a
n
d
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
S
D
s
h
a
r
e
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
1
9
6
0
>
0
.
5
1
9
6
0
<
0
.
5
V
R
A
-
1
9
6
0
>
0
.
5
1
9
6
0
<
0
.
5
A
l
l
S
o
u
t
h
(
S
D
)
(
A
L
)
C
o
v
e
r
e
d
(
S
D
)
(
A
L
)
 
L
o
g
(
c
i
t
y
p
o
p
.
)
0
.
1
6
7
−
0
.
0
2
7
0
.
1
3
8
0
.
1
9
4
0
.
5
4
8
0
.
1
5
1
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
[
0
.
0
7
5
]
∗
∗
[
0
.
1
5
1
]
[
0
.
0
6
4
]
∗
∗
[
0
.
0
6
8
]
∗
∗
∗
[
0
.
4
7
4
]
[
0
.
0
5
7
]
∗
∗
∗
 
L
o
g
(
m
e
d
.
i
n
c
.
)
−
0
.
1
1
3
−
0
.
3
0
1
0
.
0
3
4
−
0
.
0
7
1
−
0
.
3
1
7
0
.
0
0
0
1
9
6
0
–
1
9
6
7
[
0
.
0
6
5
]
∗
[
0
.
1
5
6
]
∗
[
0
.
0
4
9
]
[
0
.
0
6
7
]
[
0
.
2
3
7
]
[
0
.
0
3
8
]
N
o
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
F
-
t
e
s
t
.
2
7
9
.
0
0
1
.
1
4
8
.
3
5
5
.
0
3
2
.
1
3
8
(
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
)
O
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
,
5
5
1
3
4
5
1
,
2
0
6
8
3
8
1
4
1
6
9
7
R
2
.
7
9
.
6
9
.
7
9
.
7
6
.
6
7
.
7
4
T
o
t
.
n
o
.
c
h
a
n
g
e
r
s
5
9
2
3
3
2
N
o
t
e
s
.
T
h
e
d
a
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
V
R
A
i
s
1
9
6
5
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
b
e
l
o
w
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
s
.
∗
S
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
0
%
;
∗
∗
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
5
%
;
∗
∗
∗
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
t
1
%
.
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
–
(
3
)
e
m
p
l
o
y
s
a
m
p
l
e
o
f
a
l
l
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
c
i
t
i
e
s
;
(
4
)
–
(
6
)
o
n
l
y
c
i
t
i
e
s
i
n
V
R
A
-
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
s
t
a
t
e
s
.
I
n
t
h
e
s
e
ﬁ
r
s
t
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
F
r
a
c
.
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
a
n
d
i
t
s
s
q
u
a
r
e
e
n
t
e
r
i
n
1
9
6
0
l
e
v
e
l
s
i
n
o
r
d
e
r
t
o
p
r
o
x
y
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
f
r
a
n
c
h
i
s
e
t
o
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
.348 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
zero voting minority (where the electoral rule is inconsequential)
to π<π ∗, the only type of city that should change is the (initially)
SD moving toward AL. The AL cities should not move unless π is
very large. It is therefore not surprising that our results will be
especially strong concerning the movement toward AL.
Column (1) in the bottom part of Table III presents ﬁrst-
difference estimates for the speciﬁcation (3), where the fraction of
the minority enters linearly at the 1960 level and in a quadratic
form. The estimated coefﬁcient β1 presents the expected sign but
not β2, and both are not statistically signiﬁcant. In column (2) we
run the same regression in the portion of the data containing the
identifying information: the initially SD cities. Importantly, the
regression picks up both the linear and the quadratic effects in a
wayconsistentwiththetheory. SimilartoSectionIV.A,wecancal-
culate the effect of an increase of one standard deviation of minor-
ity sizes (0.153). The effects are −23.2% (at Q5) and +4.1% (at Q9)
of the share of single-member seats. The negative effect is around
four times larger than in Table I, conﬁrming substantial pressure
toward endogenous changes in the electoral rules. In column (3)
we restrict to the set of initially AL cities. Here identiﬁcation is
due to a very small fraction of cities, the few changing, and we ﬁnd
a counterintuitive swap in coefﬁcient signs and borderline signiﬁ-
cance for the t-tests. Notice, however, that these ﬁndings are coun-
tervailed by lack of joint signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients on π and
π2, a result consistent with the model. Reassuringly, the F-test p-
value does not warrant rejection at any standard conﬁdence level.
It is also relevant to investigate how our results would change
depending on the VRA coverage. In columns (4)–(6) we run the
same speciﬁcations as for columns (1)–(3) on the VRA-fully cov-
ered states, with stronger results than in the overall South sam-
ple. Estimates especially differ on the quantitative implications
for the increasing part. Repeating our calculations, the two es-
timated effects are now −23.5% at Q5 and +11% at Q9 for the
sample of cities initially SD. Again we detect individual but no
joint signiﬁcance of π and π2 for the AL cities (the F-test p-value
does not warrant rejection at any standard conﬁdence level).
IV.D. Minority Representation
Ourbasicstoryholdsthatelectoralrulesaffecttheratioofmi-
norities elected differently. The representational ratio (RR) is the
fraction of minority councilmen in a council divided by the fraction
of the population that belongs to the minority and is availableELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 349
TABLE IV
CITY ELECTORAL RULE AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION:C ROSS-SECTIONAL AND
WITHIN-CITY VARIATION
Frac. minority < mean(frac.
mean(frac. minority) < frac. π∗ < frac.
Sample: All U.S. minority) minority <π ∗ minority
Panel A: OLS, cross-section 1990
Dependent variable: representaional ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SD share 0.082 0.081 0.146 0.088
[0.031]∗∗∗ [0.038]∗∗ [0.057]∗∗ [0.059]
Log(city population) 0.072 0.036 0.051 0.053
[0.011]∗∗∗ [0.018]∗∗ [0.017]∗∗∗ [0.021]∗∗
Log(median income) −0.208 −0.092 −0.507 −0.202
[0.033]∗∗∗ [0.035]∗∗∗ [0.081]∗∗∗ [0.073]∗∗∗
Frac. minority 1.127 3.821 0.156 0.833
[0.057]∗∗∗ [0.426]∗∗∗ [0.239] [0.177]∗∗∗
Observations 3,507 2,375 934 198
R2 .13 .06 .10 .13
Panel B: city ﬁxed effects, panel 1980–2000
Dependent variable: representaional ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SD share 0.216 0.027 0.433 0.296
[0.058]∗∗∗ [0.102] [0.193]∗∗ [0.092]∗∗∗
Log(city population) 0.087 0.188 −0.131 −0.028
[0.080] [0.115] [0.288] [0.132]
Log(median income) −0.017 −0.043 0.269 −0.163
[0.120] [0.150] [0.518] [0.264]
Frac. minority −0.248 −0.359 −0.858 −0.272
[0.227] [1.105] [1.678] [0.472]
Observations 10,252 6,874 1,925 1,453
R2 .71 .67 .87 .87
Notes. Robust standard errors are in brackets below coefﬁcients. ∗Signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗∗signiﬁcant at 5%;
∗∗∗signiﬁcant at 1%. Standard errors are clustered at the city level in Panel B. In Panel B all regressions
include year ﬁxed effects and sample coverage period is 1980–2000. The representational ratio is the fraction
of nonwhite councilmen in the council divided by the fraction of the population that is nonwhite.
for our all-U.S.-cities sample in the years 1980, 1990, and 2000.35
We regress RR on our variable of interest, the single-district
rule variable. Table IV reports the results. The null hypothesis
35. Very few cities for the all-U.S. sample present representational ratios of
minorities of more than 1, indicating overly proportional representation. Even
fewer of them are present in the South. In order to limit the role of these outliers,
we limit the representational ratio to be smaller than 5.350 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
that the electoral rule adopted by a city has no association with
the representational ratio is soundly rejected both in a 1990
cross-sectional regression (Panel A, column (1)) and in ﬁxed-effect
regressions in which time-invariant city-speciﬁc unobserved
heterogeneity is accounted for (Panel B, column (1)).36 Single-
district rules substantially increase the chance of minorities to be
proportionally represented at the municipal level. Recalling that
the fraction of single-district seats, SDshare, is deﬁned over the
[0,1] interval, our results in column (1) imply an average increase
in the RR of the city council between 8.2 %( i nP a n e lA )a n d2 1 .6%
(in Panel B) from switching from a fully at-large rule to a fully
single-district rule. This is a quantitatively substantial effect:
each black or minority vote has more than one-ﬁfth more weight
in terms of electoral representation under single-district than
under at-large elections.37 Finally, let us note that the correlations
presented in column (1) identify the effect of the electoral rule on
the representational ratio without the strong exclusion restriction
that the fraction of the minority has an independent effect on RR.
In columns (2)–(4) we provide evidence that the impact of
the single-district rule on the representational ratio is actually
nonmonotonic in the size of the minority by looking at the effect
of the single-district variable at different levels of π. As discussed
above, our model implies that the sign of the coefﬁcient should
be the highest in intermediate ranges of π and the lowest when
the fraction of the minority is either very small or very large.
The three ranges we employ are below the mean of π;38 between
the mean and the minimum, π∗, of the U computed in Table I
(column (1) for the cross-section and (4) for the panel); and above
π∗. The effect of single-district is quantitatively always stronger
at intermediate ranges. A similar picture arises in the ﬁxed effect
analysis of Panel B. Note that the effect of SDshare is consistently
signiﬁcantandlargeinboththecrosssectionandthepanelonlyat
intermediate ranges of π. The results are inﬂuenced by the choice
of the thresholds, but the decreasing effect of SDshare seems to
be a robust feature of the data.
36. All panel speciﬁcations include year ﬁxed effects and a set of standard
controls for city size (log population) and income levels (log household median
income in 1990 dollars), and we apply the same clustering as in Table I.
37. Focusing on the South produces even stronger estimates, in a range of
one-third. Sass and Pittman (2000) also provide panel data evidence on the effect
of electoral rule on minority representation reporting a representational ratio
differential of 36% larger then but comparable with our estimates. Our results
extend to more recent data and a substantially larger sample of cities.
38. The mean π for the 1990 sample is 0.125, and that for the panel is 0.130.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 351
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the problem of minority representation in
political systems where majorities can strategically manipulate
electoral rules. Empirical validation of this approach comes from
the experience of cities in the United States before and after the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Before the Voting Rights Act, racial minorities were essen-
tially disenfranchised in the U.S. South. Therefore, the type of
electoral institutions was irrelevant in determining the level of
control of the white majority—a level of control that was almost
absolute. The Voting Rights Act allowed racial minorities to enter
into the political arena. The white majorities reacted, within the
legal boundaries of the Voting Rights Act, by changing electoral
rules to minimize expected minority inﬂuence. This evidence sug-
gests how institutions (in this case electoral rules) evolve rather
quickly in response to changes in the environment and raises
questions about empirical evidence that holds electoral institu-
tions as exogenous.
APPENDIX I: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (a) is straightforward. For part (b)
consider that
LAL
W = 0 < LSD
W if π ∈

1
3
−
α
6
,
1
2
−
α
6

;
and LAL
W and LSD
W are both linear increasing in π for π ∈ (1/2 −
α/6,1/3). At π = 1/3, we may have two cases. In Case 1, it holds
that
LAL
W =

1 −
1
α

 >LSD
W = δ
and hence a unique cut-off  π ∈ (1/2 − α/6,1/3) exists with the
desired properties. In Case 2,
 

1 −
1
α

≤ δ and  >δ .
For π ∈ (1/3,1/2) the loss LAL
W is linear increasing in π and LSD
W is
constantatδ.Hencetheexistenceofauniquecut-off  π ∈ (1/3,1/2)
in this case. Finally, to establish part (c) consider that for any π
between 0 and 1/2, we have
LSD
W ≥ LAL
W ,352 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
because here   = δ and
(4)

1 −
2
α
(1 − 3π)+
+
≥

1 −
3
α
(1 − 2π)
+
.
Atπ =1/2,(4)holdswithequality.Thisestablishestheproposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. Deﬁne N1/N = n1 and ρ = NTOT/N.
Normalize u(0) = 0. The expected utility of a pure AL is
UAL
W = Pr(α<X)u(1),
where X(π) = N(1 − 2π).
Theprobabilityunderasingle-memberdistrictsystemofwin-
ning type-2 districts 1,2,...,N2 for W is
Pr

α<
(1 − 2πN/N2)
f

.
With constant f =1/N2 indicate Y(π) = (1−2πN/N2)+/f = (N2 −
2πN)+. Then the expected utility of pure SD for given π is
USD
W = Pr(α>Y)u(n1) + Pr(α<Y)u(1).
Notice that X(π) > Y (π), ∀π.
Consider the value of π∗ at which the expected share of seats
wonby W isthesameunderpureALandpureSD.Foranyπ<π ∗,
AL is actuarially more favorable than SD. If W is risk averse, the
ˆ π at which USD
W = UAL
W lies in the interval (πAL
0 ,π∗) ,s i n c eA Li sa
riskier electoral rule. A unique point ˆ π always exists, as shown in
the text. It follows that
USD
W = UAL
W (5)
=⇒ Pr(α>Y) = Pr(Y <α<X)
u(1)
u(n1)
,
where
Pr(α>Y) = 1 − (N2 − 2πN)
+ /α
Pr(Y <α<X) = N1/α.
Hence (5) implies that at ˆ π,
(6)
u(1)
u(n1)
=
α
N1
−
1
N1
(N2 − 2ˆ πN)
+ <
α
N1
<
N
N1
.
A risk averse W will always accept at least a small amount of
risk that is actuarially favorable. Therefore, at ˆ π W will prefer a
mixed system to a pure SD rule.ELECTORAL RULES AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 353
To see this, deﬁne the number of SD councilmen per district
ρ and consider the problem of W for π = ˆ π:
max
ρ

UMX
W (ρ)

subject to 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ.
The expected utility of a mixed system MX for given π is
UMX
W = Pr(α>X)u(ρn1/ρ) + Pr(Y <α<X)u (7)
×((ρn1 + ρ − ρ)/ρ) + Pr(α<Y)u(1).
By using the expression in (7) and allowing ρ to take continuous
values, the FOC for the problem is
 (ρ) =
1
ρ
[n1 Pr(α>X)u (ρn1/ρ)
−(1 − n1)Pr(Y <α<X)u ((ρn1 + ρ − ρ)/ρ)].
Consider  (ρ)a tπ = ˆ π,
 (ρ) =
Pr(Y <α<X)
ρN
(8)
∗

N1

u(1)
u(n1)
− 1

u (ρn1/ρ) − N2u ((ρn1 + ρ − ρ)/ρ)
	
,
where we use the fact that Pr(α>X) = Pr(α>Y) − Pr(Y <α<
X) and condition (5). We are interested in evaluating (8) at ρ = ρ :
(9)  (ρ = ρ) =
Pr(Y <α<X)
ρN
u (n1)

N1

u(1)
u(n1)
− 1

− N2
	
.
By replacing in (9) the expression in (6) we can see that the FOC is
strictly negative at ρ = ρ. This is because the element in brackets
in (9) is strictly negative by (6):
N1
u(1)
u(n1)
− N < 0.
This excludes W choosing a pure SD system. Because at ˆ πUSD
W is
not the optimum and USD
W = UAL
W , a pure AL rule cannot be an
optimum either. This implies that W will choose a mixed system
with ρ  = 0,ρ = ρ.Finally, by continuity, in a neighborhood (π3,π 4)
of ˆ π the same must hold.
This establishes the proposition.354 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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APPENDIX III: SUMMARY STATISTICS:S OUTH REGION
Form of
Year Single district government Fract. minority Population
1930 Mean 0.1901865 0.6144578 0.240152 55,689.73
St. dev. 0.3417885 0.6756604 0.1527653 97,710.1
Min. 0 −1 0.00094 284.928
Max. 0.9473684 1 0.9616204 80,4874.1
N obs. 144 166 137 137
1940 Mean 0.3677645 0.2313253 0.2214527 44,127.13
St. dev. 0.4594916 0.7952042 0.1455125 85,805.16
Min. 0 −1 0.0002387 4,868
Max. 1 1 0.5976929 859,100.3
N obs. 415 415 229 229
1950 Mean 0.3452313 0.254065 0.2088538 32,005.15
St. dev. 0.4523494 0.7459898 0.1448257 73,305.76
Min. 0 −1 0.0001114 2,774
Max. 1 1 0.7235112 949,708.4
N obs. 486 492 492 492
1960 Mean 0.2539517 0.2642643 0.1941368 34,242.28
St. dev. 0.4137504 0.6755555 0.1454932 82,867.91
Min. 0 −1 0 3,202.001
Max. 1 1 0.6946776 939,023.6
N obs. 656 666 663 663
1970 Mean 0.1613318 0.2837259 0.1779699 29,274.97
St. dev. 0.3543261 0.5554105 0.150278 79,091.1
Min. 0 −1 0 2,406
Max. 1 1 0.7703364 1,199,388
N obs. 904 934 936 936
1980 Mean 0.1721898 0.4061962 0.1825356 21,936.64
St. dev. 0.3517008 0.536582 0.1646552 74,266.77
Min. 0 −1 0 113
Max. 1 1 0.9988168 1,595,138
N obs. 1,073 1,162 1,146 1,162
1990 Mean 0.2301296 0.3983558 0.2088375 20,532.95
St. dev. 0.3838137 0.5150512 0.1756844 53,238.92
Min. 0 −1 0 243
Max. 1 1 0.9864677 935,926.6
N obs. 1,072 1,338 1,299 1,338
2000 Mean 0.318919 0.3225517 0.2462236 24,421.92
St. dev. 0.4229846 0.5082095 0.1855629 89,530.48
Min. 0 −1 0 138
Max. 1 1 0.9933691 1,954,847
N obs. 1,010 1,113 1,113 1,113
Total Mean 0.2454504 0.3385301 0.2055153 26,973.67
St. dev. 0.4016687 0.5937366 0.1662955 76,418.88
Min. 0 −1 0 113
Max. 1 1 0.9988168 1,954,847
N obs. 5,760 6,286 6,015 6,070356 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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